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Abstract
In recent months, the health of the macroeconomy has suffered due to logistical issues, inflation,
and the labor market. Specifically, supply-side shocks within the semiconductor industry have
dramatically affected firms’ ability to produce chipsets. The resulting destabilization is felt
across innumerable downstream sectors which rely on these products for implementation into
their own finished goods. This paper examines the exact impacts of these recent developments
within the semiconductor industry, utilizing what-if and historical analysis to gauge how
logistical issues, inflation, and increased capital expenditures will financially impact both firms
within the industry and those which depend on their production. Additionally, it will utilize
general hypothetical scenarios to discover what firms can do, if anything, to abate the current
shortage and assuage concerns regarding future issues. The most common financial decisions,
such as the allocation of funds for capital expenditure and research & development, are analyzed
in-depth to ascertain how budgeting for these items must be shifted in response to widespread
component and production shortages. Given vertical integration within this industry, the
response of any one firm will differ greatly, as will their interactions with the supply chain.
However, generalizable analysis can provide context for firm decisions regardless of the current
health of the industry, leading to a more rigorous and logical examination of trends affecting
both this market and the macroeconomy.
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Introduction
In recent months, significant macroeconomic and political trends have dramatically affected
equity markets. The ongoing pandemic, the labor market’s corresponding road to recovery, and
various concerns regarding supply chain issues and inflation have all caused severe volatility in
numerous markets.
Specifically, the information technology sector has been severely weakened by these
developments. The sector has performed feebly year-to-date, only recently rebounding and
showing signs of life.1 This is in stark contrast to how the industry fared at the beginning of the
pandemic in March 2020. Most companies in the industry did well throughout the beginning of
the pandemic as other sectors and industries relied on technological hardware, services, and
digitization to enable remote learning and working. Meanwhile, consumer-related sectors,
healthcare, and energy all struggled significantly more.
Now that the economy is slowly recovering, analysts expect information technology
companies will be unable to match last year’s high growth. Conversely, as individuals gain the
ability to spend freely, consumer spending on both staples and discretionary goods will increase
exponentially. Moreover, supply chain issues caused by low levels of manufacturing during the
pandemic continue to impact the sector holistically, as well as other industries which depend on
their production. Additionally, these supply chain issues have direct economic impact in the form
of prolonging already severe inflation. On September 30th, 2021, Federal Reserve chairman
Jerome Powell noted that factory shutdowns caused by supply issues directly boost inflation due
to the limited production of finished goods. Unfortunately, monetary and fiscal policy is
relatively powerless to remedy these supply-side shocks, only the direct effects of these
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shortages can be mitigated.2 While these supply chain issues affect nearly every industry, their
impacts on the semiconductor industry have cascaded to devastate dozens of other sectors and
are therefore exceedingly disruptive.
The logistical obstacles the semiconductor industry faces coincide, unfortunately, with
numerous other issues. Primarily, heightened demand has led to the manufacturing, design, and
retail of semiconductors becoming increasingly attractive, thereby boosting competition
dramatically. The resulting shifts in market share have lowered marginal returns for nearly all
firms, motivating many to undercut competitors by lowering the prices of their products.
Coupled with inflation and a need for more rapid innovation, this altogether results in quicker
product cycles but a stifled ability to manufacture the required quantity of products. Of course,
because of lower unit prices and less production, returns lower even more dramatically. As a
result, the amount of available funds that manufacturing and design firms have to reinvest in and
improve their capital assets is drastically reduced, prolonging supply chain issues, financial
hardship, and macroeconomic inflation. This most severely impacts companies like Nvidia
Corp., Intel Co., and American Micro Devices. These firms specialize in the design and retail of
chips, but not always their manufacturing. Meanwhile, manufacturing firms like Taiwan
Semiconductor Manufacturing Company and GlobalFoundries are maxing out capacity and
reinvesting heavily in production efforts to catch more downstream revenue.
This thesis will attempt to examine the exact impacts of these recent developments within
the semiconductor industry, utilizing what-if and historical analysis to gauge how logistical
issues, inflation, and increased capital expenditures will financially impact both firms within the
industry and those which depend on their production. Additionally, it will utilize general
hypothetical scenarios to discover what firms can do, if anything, to abate the current shortage
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and assuage concerns regarding future issues. While the utilization of pro-forma financial
statements and DCF valuation techniques appears logical, the analytical models used to gauge
the severity of supply chain issues within this industry focus mostly on technical data. Therefore,
estimating the quantitative economic effect of supply chain changes or technical development
becomes exceedingly difficult.

Semiconductor Shortage and its Implications
In the early 2000s, the proliferation of the internet and the increasing popularity of PCs boosted
demand for semiconductors and the products they constituted dramatically. Ethernet equipment,
network processors, and other devices all rely heavily on the production of semiconductors.3
Firms now utilize microprocessors for a wide array of applications. As technological innovation
intensifies, demand has rapidly increased. According to Price Waterhouse Coopers’ 2018
forecast, semiconductor market growth was estimated to increase by 94% between 2016 and
2022, with the logic and memory segments seeing the largest growth (see Fig. 1).

Figure 1: Semiconductor Market Growth by Segment (source: PwC Research)
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This significant growth of the semiconductor market is attributable directly to the
proliferation of artificial intelligence in vehicles, an increased emphasis on immersive
technology, and the continued integration of semiconductors into everyday products like
toothbrushes and scales. In the automotive market, semiconductors have allowed firms to make
their vehicles safer and more efficient, but their implementation coupled with the prolonged
effects of the COVID-19 pandemic has drastically slowed the production of some cars.4
During the first months of the pandemic, automakers reacted to global lockdowns by
deprioritizing production and severely decreasing their chip purchases. In response to this,
semiconductor retailers shifted their focus to producing PCs and mobile workstations to support
workers who had to remain at home and enable remote healthcare. However, automotive firms’
demand for semiconductors recovered much faster than chip manufacturers had estimated (see
Fig. 2). Unfortunately for much of the market, chip manufacturers historically take a very

Figure 2: YoY Monthly Sales Growth in Automotive Chipsets 2019-20 (source: World Semiconductor
Trade Statistics Bluebook Sales Data. 2020-2019) 5
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long time to ramp up production. This quality is made worse by the fact that many firms are
expanding production simultaneously, pinching the overall supply of raw materials and resources
(see Fig. 3). Specifically, manufacturers suffer the effects of reduced supplies of glass substrates
and Ajinomoto Build-up Film (ABF), severely restraining the production of GPUs and CPUs. 6

Figure 3: Chip lead times 2018-21 (source: Bloomberg.com) 7

Due to these increasing lead times, the semiconductor industry and its economics can be
viewed as a lagging indicator. Depending upon the willingness of individuals to spend money on
consumer good that utilize chipsets, firms within the industry see highly fluctuating profitability.
Because of this inextricable tie to the macroeconomy, the industry is highly volatile, and booms
of demand follow busts with remarkable rapidity. Due to shifting prioritization as the pandemic
fades, demand for semiconductors has revived suddenly and intensely. While the pandemic
introduces unsystematic and irregular variables, conditions are unpredictable even during normal
times. For instance, three of the most recent downturns in the industry can be directly attributed
to oil shocks in 1975, 1982, and 1991 (see Fig. 3).7 Meanwhile, the Asian recessionary crisis of
1998 and the .com bubble also led to considerable turmoil within the industry.
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Figure 3: Semiconductor shipments compared to macroeconomic recessions (source: World
Semiconductor Trade Statistics)

The sector’s strong ties to the macroeconomy are exactly why a shortage is currently
occurring. In March 2020, semiconductor firms reacted to the crash of the stock market by
deprioritizing production, assuming demand for consumer goods would rapidly decline alongside
the economy at large (see Fig. 4).8 It is paramount for these firms to cut expenses and survive
these crashes, as the fabs and equipment necessary to produce chipsets come with high fixed
costs and overhead. However, the stimulus packages dispersed in response to the pandemic led to
the economy recovering rapidly. As perceived demand fell, then consequently surged, fabs
needed to quickly raise capacity to meet recovering consumer good demand.
Importantly, the high fixed costs of fabs and factories require manufacturing firms to
continue producing as much as possible once capital investments are made. The priority for these
businesses will always be to raise whatever profit they can to amortize their high fixed costs. In
the current environment, demand is high enough for these firms to earn returns. However, given
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Figure 4: Semiconductor Index compared to S&P500 and S&P500 Tech Indices (source:
Bloomberg.com)

a glut in supply, they are forced to sell chips at what is effectively a survival cost. Moreover, the
simultaneous construction of fabs by numerous firms is characterized by supply chain constraints
and demand imbalances. Numerous foundries will fight over access to the best construction and
engineering talent as these facilities ramp up. These trends in capacity, just as much as demand,
are the determinants of the semiconductor industry’s business cycle.
As explained above, the semiconductor business cycle and the shocks it experiences are
determined largely by capacity. While the current concern of the market is that of a severe and
sudden chip shortage, it may just as quickly develop into overproduction depending on the state
of the economy. Because shortages have so badly scarred the industry, foundries and fabs such
as Intel and TSMC are becoming more willing to raise the inventory levels of certain
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components and end products. Additionally, because supply chains can be thrown into disarray
by one missed shipment, just-in-time inventory methods are no longer viable for the industry.
Due to demand and supply imbalances, chip manufacturers have rapidly shifted priority to
constructing new fabs and factories to boost capacity. Firms such as AMD and Apple, two of
TSMC’s largest customers, have had severe issues with product rollouts resulting from the
current lack of capacity. Missing these launch cycles or releasing an obsolete chipset can have
dire consequences in such a competitive industry. Companies like these have proper precautions
to dilute the impact of these shortages to their bottom line, and so while the negative effects are
limited, they are non-zero.9
The more difficult and severe issue for these companies is forecasting when capacity will
be able to meet current demand, and whether that demand will persist. End consumers do not
directly purchase semiconductors, but the finished goods they contribute towards. This degree of
separation adds a layer of complexity to forecasting where supply and demand will intersect, an
issue exasperated by heightening lead times. Moreover, this calculation must consider the evershortening shelf life of chipsets. As the industry grows more competitive, the rate at which firms
must roll out and refresh their product line is growing perpetually shorter. Because fabless firms
are the most product-oriented and technologically intensive part of this industry, the nuanced and
purposeful use of their capital assets is the most intriguing and relevant. Due to the degree of
their capital investments and the necessity of consistent product rollouts, fabless firms must
prioritize securing stock and ensuring capacity is high enough to meet their demands. While it is
simple for speculators and investors to demand a higher degree of investments go towards
increasing capacity, the unpredictability of the business cycle and the cost of these facilities
precludes snap judgment and can drastically extend shortages. It is estimated that a state-of-the
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art fab built in the United States has an average cost of $3B.10 Given intense fluctuations in the
industry’s wellbeing as seen in figure 4, outlaying this money with no insight to the industry’s
likely cycles may prove disastrous.
Therefore, estimating the trends the industry will go through and to what degree they will
affect demand is exceedingly important. To do this, trade journals and industry experts consider
two disparate analyses. First, many experts judge the industry to follow a traditional cycle with
its troughs and peaks lasting roughly five years. However, the growth experienced during those
peaks varied widely.11 This degree of analysis alone cannot explain why, from 1970 to 1995, the
industry grew at a compound annual rate of 16%, while from 1995 to 2000, it grew at an annual
rate of only 6%.12
Meanwhile, the second traditional method of analysis incorporates what downstream and
macroeconomic effects impact demand for semiconductors. As mentioned above, major
recessions are enough to dramatically affect demand. Additionally, though, an oversupply of
chips can effectively crash the industry due to imbalances. If intermediate consumers such as
automakers and computer component manufacturers have too large of inventories, their demand
the following year will necessarily struggle to match the consistent stream of chips that
manufacturers produce. Because the fundamental structure of semiconductor manufacturers
incentivizes them to produce as many chips as possible to lower the impact of high fixed costs,
just one year of this imbalance is enough to damage firms and the industry for years.13 According
to Liu’s 2005 article, a block exogeneity test shows that 24.678% of the industry’s global
variation in revenue is due to the efficacy of inventory management. Meanwhile, the number of
semiconductors produced by both U.S. firms and global firms accounts for roughly 34% of the
industry’s global revenue variation.14 These empirical findings are consistent with the basic
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functions and characteristics of the semiconductor industry. With high degrees of R&D and
capital investment, companies with short product cycles and a demand for manageable lead
times, many manufacturers focus on expanding capacity as quickly as possible by increasing
efficiency and advancing the sophistication of their machinery. This, to many, may seem the
only way to guarantee growth in market share.
Given these characteristics, managing the supply of semiconductors and finding where
production and forecasted demand will coincide is the primary solution for developing consistent
business cycles. Troughs come about due to regular overcapacity across the industry, leading to
bulging inventories which oversaturate the market and incentivize downstream customers to stop
buying chips. In turn, the largest semiconductor manufacturers can continue selling whatever
paltry amount the market still necessitates at their survival cost, just enough to cover costs.
Meanwhile, smaller and newer firms are forced to match that low sales price which, in most
cases, cannot sufficiently amortize their higher and less refined cost systems, leading to
acquisition or outright liquidation. Most often, this results in a degree of technology transfer and
competition consequently suffers. Subsequently, the cycle continues. Because larger firms face
relatively little consequences, their prognostications regarding the positive impacts of capacity
expansion outweighs the negative implications of oversupply, feeding into the dramatic
fluctuations that characterize the industry.

Capital Investment and Asset Management in the Semiconductor Industry
To assuage the effects of chip shortages and a lack of capacity due to sudden demand, chip
foundries and manufacturers have intensely increased their investment in new fabs and factories.
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Over three years, TSMC plans to spend over $100B to expand capacity and build new fabs in
Arizona, an unprecedented step for the Taiwanese company.15 Intel has vowed to match this with
a $20B investment in their own Arizonan fabs.16 While these investments are significant and
implicative for the future of semiconductor manufacturing capacity, the actions of individual
fabless manufacturers are just as profound. Although capacity and its relationship to demand has
been proven to be the most significant determinant of the semiconductor industry’s business
cycle, the degree to which fabless manufacturers invest in new and diverse sets of equipment
also dictates the state of the industry and its firms.
The financial performance of fabless manufacturers relies heavily on how efficient they
can make their processes while still emphasizing technological advancement. The
hypercompetitive and increasingly complex nature of the industry necessitates that these firms
prioritize new product development (NPD) via both technological depth and breadth.17 Due to
the state of the industry, firms are now unable to rely on existing technologies as their growth
driver. Instead, they must invest into making continual innovations and improvements to eke out
more growth than competitors. Meanwhile, offering a wide array of products and solutions for
customers ensures their mix is diversified and shielded against volatility, providing a path for
consistent and growing profitability.
NPD requires numerous intentional business and financial decisions, chief among them
being an efficient and realistic research and development process. This R&D process and the
consistent expansion of technological capability necessitates repeated investments in capital
assets and infrastructure. The sophistication of these capital assets highly affect a firm’s lead
time and ability to change the industry’s standards via technological advancement.18 Another key
component of technological advancement is designing a product platform which makes fabless
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firms more efficient and reliable. To build economies of scale and make sufficient use of
expensive capital equipment, firms ensure their product platforms are adaptable and fit for a
variety of uses. The products derived from these platforms can be quickly adjusted based on
demand while new technologies can be developed efficiently and accurately. This product
differentiation can be used as a basis to enter new market segments and efficiently add growth to
a company’s portfolio.19
As identified above, the two most significant drivers of profitability and growth via
innovation is a purposeful and strategic investment in efficient capital assets and product
platforms. For technological-intensive firms, being able to iterate on past advancements with
new, ground-breaking techniques is the most impactful intangible asset possible. Not only does it
positively affect their financial performance, but it also bolsters their market share and supports
the maintenance of their portion of that industry. Because fabless manufacturers are largely
removed from the acquisition and supply of raw materials, these capital investments enable them
to derive the maximum value from the supply chain.20
Because the market now must cater to highly diverse and unique needs depending on the
customer, the development of rigorous and efficient product platforms becomes more expensive,
and the process lengthier. Much like forecasting capacity, the construction of product platforms
requires a certain amount of inference alongside competitive strategy. Additionally, these wagers
on future trends are made riskier and more speculative by just how long it takes to ramp
development of new platforms. A fabless manufacturer may make a bet regarding the future of
the market which takes effect 5-7 years later, only for the market to have moved in an entirely
different direction.21 However, accurate prognostication of future trends represents an incredible
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competitive advantage which can provide a firm with long-term growth opportunities, thereby
enabling them to be even more speculative with their future development.
Just as important to a firm as their technological capability and product platforms is the
efficiency of their innovations and the potential impacts they have. Measuring the efficiency of
innovations made by a firm has historically been done using stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) or
data envelopment analysis (DEA) to measure innovation based on inputs and outputs.22 SFA
allows firms to analyze single output scenarios. It can be used to measure the use of financial
resources, via cost and profit efficiency analysis, or be applied to more abstract cases, such as the
efficiency and efficacy of R&D. Conversely, DEA can account for numerous outputs and inputs
since it is “non-parametric”, meaning the data are not assumed to come from predefined
models.23 While DEA excels at examining relationships between inputs and outputs, it fails to
consider non-operational or unsystematic factors. Therefore, numerous stages must be
implemented to form context. While traditional forms of DEA can be used for self-assessment,
they are not capable of gauging a firm’s impact on the industry or surrounding communities.
To be deemed successful, innovation must return real and quantifiable financial and
technical benefits to a firm. Both inputs and outputs are variable dependent on the exact scenario,
but inputs generally involve labor, capital expenditures, and in this case, patent management.
Meanwhile, outputs would be represented by the sales or profits a firm enjoys, as well as the
patent applications they file. In the semiconductor industry specifically, the degree of capital and
talented labor personnel required to achieve adequate outputs increases exponentially.24
Importantly, the labor input catches both lab technicians who help manufacture chips, as
well as researchers and other personnel involved in R&D and associated activities. Additionally,
due to the competitiveness of the industry and the importance of unique products, patent
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management and the associated degree of intellectual capital a firm has is essential to consider.25
Outputs for this model are comprised of sales and patents. While patents are the most important
and direct indicator of innovation output, the profitability of the firm depends on whether the
sales generated from pre-existing innovations outweigh the capital expenditures and labor costs a
firm creates today. Importantly, not all innovations are patentable, or the ability to patent them
may fluctuate according to legislature. And while patent applications are paramount when
advancing technologically, their value to the business is accomplished only through
commercialization. The ability of a firm to iterate on past technology entirely depends on
previous innovations achieving commercial success. Therefore, the sales and profits generated
from innovation via development is the most appropriate indicator for economic viability. The
degree of temporal separation between inputs and outputs is also exceedingly important to
consider. The semiconductor industry experiences rapid and dramatic levels of technological
iteration according to Moore’s Law. Because of this, the time lag between inputs and outputs is
generally accepted as just one year, much lower than other industries.26 To remain viable within
the industry, a firm must ensure that their innovation is done efficiently by using a combination
of in-depth forecasting and DEA.
It has been established that to be performant, both technologically and economically, a
fabless firm must consistently roll out new products and design product platforms which are
efficient, scaling, and multi-use. All these targets must be accomplished within an exceptionally
narrow time frame, quick enough to either set the pace of the industry or match competitors’
cadence, while simultaneously ensuring that meaningful technical advancements have been
made. While the exact relationships between economic fluctuations and innovative
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breakthroughs is difficult to track, there is little doubt that a firm’s ability to iterate on their base
technologies will directly determine their degree of financial success.
Recent federal incentives for innovation in both China and the United States have spurred
many researchers to examine exactly what effect technical advantages have on the business cycle
and vice versa. Generally, there are two perspectives for when a business should innovate. Some
argue that the relationship is countercyclical, meaning that a firm will hesitate to devote
resources to R&D and associated activities when in a period of high production, and will only
transition their resources once production slows. Alternatively, the procyclical hypothesis argues
that periods of high production are the best time to begin product development. Because these
periods are when firms can accurately estimate the degree of their cash inflows, they lend the
most data and context to the decision-making bodies.27
For the semiconductor industry, the correlation between business cycle and technological
iteration is blurred. As product cycles narrow, product development also becomes more rapid.
Per year, any given firm will roll out 1-3 products per segment which have been developed over
the course of 5-7 years. The advantage previous innovations have provided seldom last very long
until competitors are able to render them obsolete or match them. This incentivizes firms to
target the short boom period following product launches to begin exploring new conceptual
breakthroughs and achieve competitive advantages, thereby following a procyclical model.28 The
competitiveness within the industry and the short ramp times it necessitates ubiquitously impacts
both the financial and technological decisions of firms.
While a major part of the current semiconductor shortage has to do with shifting quickly
back to max production, the direst consequences of the shortage have to do with simple products,
not technologically advanced ones. While a lower capacity for high-end chips drastically affects
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fabless firms, the health of the macroeconomy and downstream consumers is more accurately
gauged by how effectively a firm can produce 10- or 14-nanometer chipsets. However, the
demand of major fabless firms like Apple and AMD for performant, 5- or 7-nanometer chips
outweighs the demand of downstream consumers for semiconductors used in everyday
products.29 Because product platforms are often designed to be used for a diverse set of products,
these sets of demand necessarily interfere. Thereby, the flow and supply of less complex, more
ubiquitous chips is affected drastically by both capacity and raw material shortages.
Both innovation via product development and the expansion of overall production
capacity can be suggested as ways to remediate the chip shortage. Ensuring that product
platforms are efficient, that resources are used effectively to pursue innovations, and that
research and development is done at an appropriate time in the business cycle are all ancillary
but essential facets of shortage remediation. While these numerous financial and technical
decisions are productive and can help firms to cope with shortages, the external dependencies
within the industry are numerous and drastic, making it an exceedingly fragile ecosystem.
Despite many interfirm solutions, the multi-faceted issues continue to elongate the shortage and
individual firms can do very little but cushion themselves and wait. Whilst foundries like TSMC
and Intel construct new facilities to increase capacity, the macroeconomic imbalances between
constrained supply and ever-increasing demand continues to pressure every firm within the
industry, as well as their direct consumers. However, the importance of the semiconductor
industry to other sectors within the economy and to national security has prompted numerous
world governments to involve themselves in these shortage concerns, assisting the firms
financially and subsidizing their production.
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Legislative Remediation and Subsidization
Legislative actions and policy tinkering have been suggested as a method to remedy chip
shortages and ensure that production resumes as soon as possible. Much of this discussion
focuses on the domestic production within either the United States or Taiwan. Local companies
such as Intel argue that the production of semiconductors within the United States is an essential
aspect of national security. Since 2015, U.S. sales of semiconductors have increased by only
34.2%, while sales by Chinese firms have increased by 83.25%, with other regions also
experiencing high increases in sales. (see Fig. 5) The catalyst for American subsidies within the
industry came in May of 2020, only two months after the beginning of the pandemic.

Figure 5: Global Semiconductor Sales by Region, 2015-20 (Source: statista.com)30
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Following a trade embargo involving Chinese electronics producer Huawei, the Chinese firm
SMIC received $2.2B in subsidies from their government to amortize both firms’ production
costs.31 While subsidies to Chinese firms are common, the American government hesitates to
interfere with the function of businesses, except in cases of extreme recessionary trends.
However, as soon as a month after the announcement of these Chinese subsidies, American
lawmakers were proposing that similar legislature be passed to support local manufacturers.32 As
part of his infrastructure plan, President Biden proposed $52B in subsidies meant for the
semiconductor industry, a facet of his plan that enjoyed unique and unprecedented bipartisan
support.33
Given the incentives other nations offer to their firms, the demands of American
semiconductor lobbyists have been reluctantly accepted by anti-economic interventionist
politicians. Three quarters of the proposed funding would go directly to producers to construct
new fabs so that they may expand their capacity. Of the $52B, $2B is reserved to produce low
complexity, cheaper semiconductors to be used by automotive manufacturers and other various
consumers, which should boost the capacity of those most ubiquitous chips. Importantly, $10.5B
of that money would also be dedicated to fund research and technical development by various
institutions, including a newly established National Semiconductor Technology Center, which
would then be equipped with lithographic machines from ASML and other equipment
manufacturing firms like LAM Research to develop new breakthroughs. In addition to this
$10.5B, $81B has been dedicated to fund the NSTC over the next five years. Much of this
funding will go towards continued research into robotics, artificial intelligence, and machine
learning. This signals a significant shift in the relationship between the U.S. legislative branch
and the semiconductor industry. Additionally, in the last week of October 2021, the Biden
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Administration requested that major chip manufacturers submit data regarding their lead times,
inventories, clients, and suppliers. With appropriate response, this information will help
legislators assist the industry long-term with a well-structured and comprehensive bill.
While the shortage and COVID-19 pandemic may have catalyzed discussion regarding
subsidies, Chinese firms and their economic relation to their government has introduced
American legislators with an ultimatum. Chinese manufacturers’ technology has already
advanced to a point where both their capacity and expertise surpasses that of American firms.
This has prompted companies like Apple and AMD to rely on them to an outsized degree. The
possibility of American firms having no other option but to contract with Chinese manufacturers
would present an existential problem to the operations and viability of all American consumers
of semiconductors. Moreover, the Chinese government is infamously ambiguous regarding the
term and degree of their subsidies, so while they may be providing support now, that can end
unpredictably. Excessive reliance on such a fragile system would in turn jeopardize the global
economy. While it will take years for these subsidies’ effects to be felt by firms and consumers,
it is a sure way to supplement both technological advancement and expanded capacity.
Although the implications of this increased capacity on the macroeconomy are difficult to
foresee, the fragility of the supply chain is certain. This consistent instability must be examined
and remediated, garnering a further analysis of the firms that constitute the industry and how
they uniquely interact with the supply chain. While policy tinkering and legislation will largely
determine the immediate recovery and viability of the industry, individual firms do have the
capability to maximize their efficiency. So, while firm-level innovation and financial
repositioning enables companies to establish inter-industry differentiation, those competitive
advantages mean little when businesses struggle to rollout new products.
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Additionally, while improved capacity will greatly assist many firms in ramping
production, it also pushes fabless firms to the periphery and incentivizes them to make material
shifts in their business strategy. For example, since most of the funding proposed by President
Biden in his Infrastructure Plan would go towards constructing fabs, fabless firms will receive
marginal benefits. In fact, since Intel is the only manufacturer of considerable size in the United
States, their direct competitors (e.g., AMD, Nvidia) will necessarily be at a disadvantage due to
this legislation. Because of this, while the legislation is an appropriate response to an
unprecedented shortage, its permanent establishment may centralize both financial and technical
advantage within the industry for those who design and manufacture their chips in house.
Instead, firms must focus on manipulating the ways they interact with the supply chain and
examine what benefits could be gained from overhauling the industry’s current habits. Because
the three distinct segments of the industry- manufacturers, retailers, and equipment producers- all
participate uniquely, further analysis of what the supply chain and shortage mean to them is
necessary for future remediation and value maximization.

Industry Segment Analysis and the Efficient Supply Chain
There are three principal stages of semiconductor production, with design being a prerequisite:
wafer fabrication and probe, assembly, and back-end operations. Due primarily to high capital
expenditure and infrastructure costs, the semiconductor industry is uniquely segmented and
specialized, meaning the supply chain is both integrated but distinct. In recent years especially,
vertically integrated firms specializing in one function of production have been able to avoid the
risks associated with constructing expensive foundries when faced by uncertain demand.
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Likewise, foundries have been able to focus solely on manufacturing while somewhat immune to
issues involving product demand. Variations of the fabless firm model have arisen, giving firms
the flexibility to forego manufacturing altogether or specialize in their own assembly and/or
testing.
The businesses in the earliest iteration of the industry often served all three discrete
functions of production, but as the industry has matured, the required pace of technological
advancement increased drastically. So too have the funds needed to develop those iterations and
the equipment that enables them. Although vertical disintegration still occurs and there are
various trends that could lend towards its favorability, most firms still favor scenarios in which
they perform 1-2 distinct functions of production. While many tech giants are rushing to design
and integrate their own chips and bring development in-house, the resources necessary to
fabricate, assemble, and test those chips is prohibitive. In fact, only two firms consistently serve
all distinct functions at once, those being Samsung and Intel. However, it should be noted that
both firms also contract with third-party component suppliers and fabrication firms to bolster
their own production.
Despite TSMC and Intel increasing their capacity dramatically with new fabs under
construction, they have both announced increased production fees, creating downstream effects
for both fabless firms and end consumers.34 Although these two most major manufacturers
currently have something of a symbiotic relationship, their simultaneous construction of
foundries puts them in a battle for talent and resources. Rising device complexity has also
motivated the two most prominent equipment manufacturers, LAM Research and ASML, to
continually increase the cost of their machinery.35 For these businesses, an imbalance between
demand and supply creates a spurt of economic opportunity. Whilst other firms within the
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industry struggle with their rollout, LAM and ASML thrive in periods of growing capacity (see
Fig. 6). Directly parallel to Moore’s Law, the so-called Stokes’ Law proposes that the cost of

Figure 6: Q3 Financial Summary for LAM Research by Segment and Region (source:
investor.lamresearch.com)

manufacturing within the industry roughly follows alongside transistor capacity. ASML, or
Advanced Semiconductors Materials Lithography, is the industry’s sole provider of the
lithographic machines necessary to produce the most complex chips. Established in 1984, the
Dutch manufacturing company’s first products cost as little as $300K ($798.6k AFI).36 In 2011,
the average cost of their machinery was roughly equivalent to $31.4M.37 Due to the exponential
increase in transistor density, ASML’s next-generation machines are forecast to cost $150M.38
The prohibitive cost of these machines continues to drive separation among the distinct firm
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types in the industry, prompting businesses to rely more on dedicated foundries to reduce fixed
costs.
These production cost increases prompted AMD to spinoff their manufacturing arm into
Global Foundries in 2008.39 And Intel, a firm which historically designed and manufactured their
chips in house has required manufacturing assistance from TSMC since widening their product
mix to include discrete graphics processing units, a surprising yet necessary business
partnership.40 The technological advantages that TSMC enjoys has prompted many to consider
the possibility of them adopting a retail arm of the business. However, like equipment
manufacturers, TSMC benefits from having a sole function which enables them to amortize high
fixed costs with contracting and production fees. Similarly, while subsidies will
disproportionately benefit firms with dedicated foundries, increasing capital expenditures will
likely prohibit fabless firms from expanding into manufacturing. The global distribution of these
firms and their facilities, as well as the increased degree of specialization necessary to maintain
financial viability has established the importance of supply chain efficiency and management.
Additionally, it has drastically altered how firms interact and how they utilize modeling to gauge
the performance of their supply chain.
Because the basic production process for integrated circuits (ICs) is relatively similar
across technologies, certain supply chain trends prevail. The majority of these introduce an
element of uncertainty, mostly concerning the supply and distribution of raw materials, the use of
which varies widely by firm. While the underlying science necessary to improve yields and
efficiency is complex and expensive, it is one of the sole ways fabless manufacturers can benefit
from what is contentiously fought-over supply of materials. Yield uncertainty is also exaggerated
by the characteristically short product cycles within the industry. As new technologies and
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products are developed, the introduction of new methods and materials necessarily gives rise to
inefficiency. Again, this is something of a continuous issue for fabless firms since they must
balance the development of new products with the high production cost of the utilized materials.
As previously mentioned, the semiconductor industry is also severely affected by
irregular business cycles which fluctuate according to macroeconomic wellbeing. For example,
global shipments between 1958 and 2007 varied from between -40% and 70% in five-year cycle
periods.41 Additionally, manufacturers must continually evaluate whether make-to-stock (MTS)
or make-to-order (MTO) structures benefit them more. Volume manufacturing is generally
favored by MTO production whilst the production of specialized products should utilize an MTS
mode.42 One of the most fundamental issues in the supply chain is the determination of which
products become more reasonable under which mode of production, each faces their own
advantages and disadvantages.
If the firm operates in MTS mode, they are often able to maintain high levels of
inventory to amortize their high fixed costs as much as possible. However, the MTS mode of
production comes without contractual agreements for production amounts, meaning there is no
guarantee foundries will be able to distribute the extra inventory they produce. On the other
hand, the MTO mode of production does come with contractual agreements, lending stability and
visibility into future demand. However, the ramp on MTO environments is more severe,
resulting in undesirably long cycle times. Some firms cope with this by utilizing modular designs
which allow for many different finished products to be constructed from a bank of semi-finished
wafers.43 In addition to this supply chain strategy, the decision of how to resource certain
components must also be continuously evaluated. Both decisions have historically been made
using a hierarchical decision support framework based on customer lead time and what materials
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are required to compose specific components.44 Although these decisions are ubiquitous
throughout any sector, the process within the semiconductor industry is once again made more
complex by rapid and unpredictable business cycles and short lead times. Therefore, analytical
frameworks addressing other characteristics of the supply chain must also be utilized.
Discrete-event simulation (DES) is a well-established analytical tool which enables
production facilities to compile data and produce statistically valid results which indicate the
efficiency (or lack thereof) based on a firm’s interactions with the supply chain. Because the
computational burden of the model is high, researchers have proposed that focusing only on
certain process steps will solve computative bottleneck concerns whilst still yielding accurate
results.45 Capacity, yield, and delay are split into separate modules used to determine the number
of lots a firm can expect from their manufacturing process, the timing of those units’ distribution,
and how efficient the process will be.46 Historical data is also utilized to create probability
distributions estimating the cycle time for upcoming production ramps. However, the DES model
used assumes that these distributions for cycle times operate independent of resource utilization
and supply, an assumption which the most recent shortage has proved thoroughly unreasonable.47
While a helpful resource, it is difficult to examine or state just how well these modeling
techniques work. The amount of data and time needed to produce such computations is largely
prohibitive, especially with shifting variables and short production cycles. These models and
their development constitute an entirely separate realm of research and analysis a firm must
undergo if they want both a successful and predictable production cycle. Like with designing
both a competitive and efficient product platform, undergoing this process may result in a
competitive advantage, or it may prove to be a waste of time and money. Still, because of the
vertical integration and specialization of firms, many entities within the industry remain distant
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from other steps in the supply chain. The degree of control they have in determining its
efficiency and value is limited to utilizing these datasets and hoping they return statistically
legitimate results. The sheer size of the industry accompanied with its pace means maximizing
the return of the supply chain is often difficult for back-end firms. In other words, what can be
done to draw efficiency from the supply chain, no matter the function of the firm, is already
being done. While incremental improvements in efficiency and resource utilization can be made
generationally, Moore’s Law continuously marches on and requires iteration on old strategies.
However, improvements can always be made to the byproducts of the supply chain.
One of the most ubiquitous topics within any industry is the sustainability of their supply
chain and what negative impacts it may have. Semiconductor manufacturing particularly is
highly resource intensive. A single wafer fab facility may consume as much as $10M-$20M in
energy consumption, a fee only bound to rise due to larger fab sizes.48 The emittance of CO2 and
other greenhouse gases and the use of perfluorocarbons (PFCs) are also both notably high.
Despite this being a glaring issue with semiconductor production, it demands relatively
little attention from researchers and industry experts. Papers suggesting infrastructural solutions
to these issues remain few and far between. However, Santana-Viera et al. have proposed a new
power generation system which takes better advantage of renewable resources and creates a
more efficient distribution to optimize square footage. Specifically, the design would utilize
photovoltaic cells and onsite wind generation to further amortize the high fixed costs of
semiconductor manufacturing facilities via energy savings and offsets.49 However, the financial
reasoning for installing PV cells and wind turbines can be difficult to establish. Much of the proforma analysis necessary to justify such a decision would be based on highly fluctuating
variables such as energy costs, the occurrence of natural disasters and their disruption of the

28

energy infrastructure, and other unpredictable events.50 In their 2016 paper, Hwang et al.
compiled a framework to analyze the relationship between manufacturing firm, supplier, and
environment. Causal relationships among these factors are evaluated using a quantitative
methodology weighted based on the opinions of industry experts. An analysis of these causal
relationships suggests there may be a quantifiable competitive advantage associated with
reducing impacts on the environment, but that the infrastructural improvements necessary to
make the supply chain green are often more expensive than unquantifiable or uncertain social
advantages.
Alternatively, Chiang et al. propose an operational solution which would introduce less
infrastructural improvements but rely on incorporating environmental considerations into the
semiconductor manufacturing process. Carbon taxes and subsidies seek to offset greenhouse
emittance, though the amount necessary to accomplish this on any large scale would drain firms
of their financial resources.51 The most likely proposal that would achieve this goal is a linear
model that charges a firm based on their capacity or contractual agreements with a fixed variable
assigned according to that firms estimated greenhouse emissions. These models would also be
able to weight the allowance of particularly harmful byproducts or chemicals in the production
process. In a field dominated by obsessively constant and rapid technical progression, the
impacts on an already heavily polluted world and what solutions may remediate them may seem
a distraction. However, the resources contributed towards technical development could easily be
reduced to a level where at least some of the industry’s emissions are offset. While this is
generalizable across many industries, it is an especially important issue for the semiconductor
industry to resolve given the ever-increasing application of semiconductors in diverse sets of
products. (see Fig. 7).
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Figure 7: Greenhouse Gas Emissions of Semiconductor and Automotive Companies (source:
Bloomberg.com)52

Firm Financing and Repositioning
As mentioned previously, many firms’ response to the semiconductor shortage is to immediately
expand or prioritize capacity. The construction of fabs is immensely expensive and significantly
impacts the business’ resources. However, more subtle cash outflows or cases of financial
repositioning must also be considered. Different firm types will have diverse abilities and
strategies in manipulating their resources. Therefore, a more in-depth analysis of their strategies
becomes necessary in understanding how these changes interact.
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The semiconductor industry depends heavily on iterative innovation on previous
technological advancements, the demands for which become progressively more intense as
competition rises. These developments are often discovered by utilizing inter-organizational
relationships and strategies. For example, AMD’s products take advantage of their manufacturer,
TSMC, and their technological expertise. The firm’s CPUs would not be nearly as performant
were they not able to take advantage of TSMC’s 5- and 3-nanometer technology. However, the
fees resulting from these inter-firm interactions are ill-defined and the conditions unclear. Due to
this high level of uncertainty, bargaining and financial power is centralized in the firm that
supplies their technological designs.
Firms create these synergies not only to share the burden of innovation, but due to
fluctuations within the industry. Collaboration allows them to share risks and expenses by
pooling their financial and intellectual resources.53 These businesses must be integrated not only
via their R&D and manufacturing process, but their entire network must be collaborative.
Because system technologies are only viable if all components are serviceable and on-time, the
failure or dysfunction of a single component can materially hinder a product launch. In these
partnerships, the semiconductor manufacturers provide financial support to component suppliers
to reduce development risk. Although many firms are powerful enough to demand a fortified
supply chain without synergies, smaller ones require organizational cooperation to guarantee a
functioning supply of components.54
While this characteristic of the industry makes it more difficult to analyze the financial
motivations of firms, it will hereafter be assumed that all firms have some sort of synergies in
place, even those that appear competitively opposed. These partnerships materialize via both
marketing and component agreements. For example, AMD and Nvidia regularly partner to
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integrate their technologies despite their GPUs being competitively opposed. To take advantage
of AMD’s strong data center chips, Nvidia’s DGX A100, used for heavy computation and
research workloads, utilizes AMD’s dies for the product’s machine-learning nodes. While these
partnerships appear strange given the competition within the industry, every firm must maintain
a diverse and distinct product line. So, although AMD and Nvidia compete via their GPU lines,
their other product mixes, such as their data center platforms, often depend on collaboration
between the firms. In this case, the firms’ technological motivations for collaboration are clear,
but the implications for market share are also relevant. Compared to Intel, AMD and Nvidia both
enjoy relatively small market share in the domestic electronics market (see Fig. 8). By using
collaborative technologies, they help each other by promoting parity within the market,

Figure 8: PC GPU (iGPU & dGPU) Global Shipments (2009-2021 Q2; source: statista.com)55

32

slowly gaining market share to compete with Intel’s strong graphics positioning.
In turn, Intel has responded with their own intra-firm collaboration to bolster their
graphics dominance. Previously, only Nvidia and AMD produced and designed discrete GPUs,
with Intel focusing on integrated graphics within their mobile and desktop CPUs. However, as
more intense graphics requirements become necessary for workstation and content creation
workloads, discrete GPUs rise in popularity, prompting Intel to launch their own line of discrete
graphics cards. To accomplish a performant platform launch, Intel openly partnered with TSMC
to cope with both capacity and cost restraints. Additionally, since TSMC has previously assisted
other firms in GPU manufacturing, their supply of components is likely more robust than
Intel’s.56 Additionally, these capacity demands from Intel limit the production available to AMD
and Nvidia, who both contract with TSMC to produce their GPUs. Partnerships within the
industry have innumerable motivations and impacts on the market and the firms within it. The
inconsistent and perpetually shifting nature of these businesses both necessitate these
collaborations and preclude their ongoing existence as financial and technological requirements
and resources change.
Regardless of the source of funding, whether it is produced externally or provided within
the firm, there are generally two major destinations for dedicated resources. As previously
mentioned, capital expenditures and research and development are the major expenses within the
industry. An efficient and productive mix of these major cash outflows is necessary to maximize
a firm’s future potential, and since the industry is obsessively focused on iterative development,
the ratios must constantly be adjusted. Much like product development and production, financial
budgets and the firms’ spending must be planned well in advance to cope with changes within
the industry. However, the strained supply chain and its effect on the industry have forced
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manufacturers’ hands. Both TSMC and Intel have rapidly shifted to capacity prioritization,
whilst amid historically high competition. These factors have greatly influenced the decisions of
firms, meaning that both CAPEX and research & development have been levered as high as is
financially advisable. Although the businesses are still exceedingly viable and healthy, their
margins are lower against historical comparisons as their expenditures have ramped up. The
graphs below show historical data financial data for Intel, AMD, Nvidia, and TSMC, including
net margin, R&D expenditures, and capital investments (see Figures 9-11).57

Figure 9: Profit Margin for Various Firms (2018-2021, source: various 10Ks)
Historically, the margins for these businesses have been remarkably consistent despite the
need for rapid iterative development. Although high competition has led to lower sales prices,
the number of unit sales and product launches per year make up for this. While the analysis of
inter-firm success, or lack thereof, is not in scope for this paper, AMD’s meteoric success in
recent years reflects the competitive nature of the industry. The launch of their Zen line in 2017
challenged Intel for the first time in decades. Meanwhile, as Intel develops and launches their
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discrete graphics line, they will also challenge AMD and Nvidia to increase the cadence of their
discrete product launches and decrease the sales price of their units.

Figure 10: Research and Development for Various Firms (2018-2021, source: various 10Ks)
Implied by this high degree of competition is the necessity for continuous improvement
and innovation. While this measure differs greatly by firm type and scale, competitors must
respond to the investment of outside firms by levering up their research. Most of these expenses
have to do with designing new architecture, maximizing the efficiency of current designs, and
subsequently engineering chips that extend Moore’s Law.60 Of course, the exact focus of every
firm’s research will remain confidential until products release, but generating breakthroughs in
chip architecture while emphasizing new areas of focus such as AI, VR/AR, high-performance
computing, and immersive tech is the primary and ever-lasting objective of every semiconductor
firm.
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Figure 11: Capital Expenditures for Various Firms (2018-2021, source: various 10Ks)
Both Intel and TSMC plan to allocate enormous amounts of resources to building fabs
and infrastructure. Intel’s capital expenditures are expected to average $19.273B per year over
the next five years.58 Meanwhile, TSMC has already pledged to spend $100B over the next three
years for R&D and capital investment.59 Production capacity is an unwavering theme of the
industry, and although the shortage has necessitated urgent response, experts wonder if the
sudden and drastic investment in new fabs will not harm TSMC’s and Intel’s ability to innovate.
The semiconductor industry is highly reactive to logistic instability. Moreover, firms are
reactionary to the decisions of other firms, creating a cycle of short-lived competitive and
technical advantages. However, neither production capacity nor research & development will
help firms cope with component shortages and other supply chain difficulties. Shortages and
frugality among consumers drastically affected product rollouts in 2020, leading to slightly lower
margins for retail firms. As time goes on, margins will continue to be impacted by high
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expenditures. However, many forecast demand to continuously increase over the short-term, at
least for the 10- and 14-nanometer chips that many downstream consumers integrate into their
appliances, vehicles, etc.
Meanwhile, component suppliers and the supply chain must seek process improvements in order
for businesses to take advantage of the future capacity increases. Component supply and the
consistency of the semiconductor supply chain may occasionally falter, but the goal of the
industry will always be to prolong and attend to Moore’s Law. Although the continuation of this
industry tenet leads to more affordable and performant products at a constant rate, the resources
needed to accomplish this increase exponentially and define the future of the industry. Because
new and innovative methods for extending Moore’s Law are so resource-consumptive, the
primary driver for its continuation is the need for competitive advantages. Were there a
monopoly, there would theoretically be a point where incremental improvements become too
expensive to develop and the industry would stagnate. However, because the industry has been
competitive since its very beginning, the need for iterative development has always persisted.
For consumers and for society, Moore’s Law is essential. No human invention has ever
exhibited the rate of improvement so precisely summarized by Gordon Moore. Upon its creation,
it defined the electronics industry and made it one of the most impactful and financially
prosperous markets in the world. The invention of consumer electronics, minicomputers, servers,
personal computers, and the internet have relied entirely upon Moore’s Law. Were firms to agree
upon stagnation, it would crash both the electronics industry- and thereby, the economy- as well
as the state of innovation. Therefore, since the creation of the industry, each inhabitant has been
engaged in a constant and very expensive arms race. No matter what else happens,
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accomplishing higher performance with a regular (and quickening) cadence will keep the
industry and its firms afloat.
Their undying dedication to innovation renders firms a degree of inflexibility. No matter
what condition they are in, firms must dedicate an appropriate amount of funds to finance future
plans. Unfortunately, this severely reduces their ability to mitigate potential shortages.
Development that simultaneously increases transistor density while also exploring the usage of
more consistently available components may be an answer, but the usage of certain components
is directly tied to a firm’s product platform, making this a costly and risky transition. Instead, the
largest and most financially viable firms must commit to investing in or even subsidizing
component suppliers. As demand for both complex and simple semiconductors continue to
increase, a steady stream of components will dictate the future of the industry. Like with all
shortages currently affecting the macroeconomy, one of the only ways to reliably remediate
future issues is to bolster the supply chain and support the originators of essential materials and
services. Ensuring components are sourced sustainably and that shipping and other methods of
distribution are reliable and well-funded is essential for the ongoing health of the industry, and
this will require investment and dedication from every major firm. This holds true for all
industries currently suffering, but given the vertical integration within the semiconductor
industry, an unreliable supply chain can ruin smaller firms in a matter of months.

Scenarios and Implications
Hitherto, the various solutions and remedies the semiconductor industry relies on to cushion
itself from fluctuation have been described, but the downstream effects and implications have
been left relatively ambiguous. In large part, this is due to the fluctuation and irregular structure
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that characterizes the semiconductor industry. A research commitment by one firm may either
reap an enormous advantage, or fall flat, depending entirely on competition, timing, supply &
demand, and other external factors. While this is true for any business’ development period, the
chaos and the uncertainty of this industry makes theoretical scenarios nearly impossible to
identify and analyze on a single-firm level. Still, scenario analysis is a constant within the
industry and is immensely important to the future wellbeing of the market. In the absence of
datasets, individual firm analysis is impossible. However, by gauging the current state of the
industry and applying different hypothetical lenses to it, analysts can better understand what
remediations have already been enacted and which firms may be considering. The following
section will describe, apply, and measure the impact of various standalone or parallel shortage
solutions.
Beginning broadly, the effect of incoming subsidies and legislature could be industrydefining. Formulated in equal parts to respond to the trade war with China and the pandemic,
these subsidies will lend firms the financial bulwark needed to weather future issues in two ways.
First, they will directly benefit chip manufacturers by providing them funds to construct facilities
and infrastructure to increase production capacity. Fabless design firms will directly benefit from
increased capacity in the short-term, but demand may increase to the point where these
improvements are only marginal. Additionally, equipment manufacturers will enjoy a period of
heightened demand, - albeit a period already in full swing- giving them the funds and flexibility
to explore new breakthroughs and drive the industry further. Second, the current legislature bill
dedicates resources to establish and fund a national research facility. No matter where it is
directed, research & development motivates technological advancement within the industry.
However, this piece of legislation is more reactive than proactive. Simply put, Chinese subsidies
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forced the government’s hand; domestic firms cannot afford to fall behind Chinese firms any
longer. The rate at which resources are consumed to produce iterative improvements makes the
dedicated $16.2B per year for five years seem relatively paltry. Contextually speaking, that’s still
$3B less than Intel is projected to spend in 2022.60 Assuming this research is done with a similar
efficiency to the industry standard, it will certainly assist firms in extending Moore’s Law and
improving significantly.
Despite the potential boon government-funded research offers, numerous issues persist.
First, domestic firms are already working at a disadvantage and research takes years to affect
firms’ decision-making. Second, while the amount dedicated may be enough to achieve global
parity within the industry given unshifting variables, Chinese firms have enjoyed research
subsidies for markedly longer than domestic firms. Realistically, domestic firms can expect to be
in the same position as they currently are five years down the line. Most importantly, these
research subsidies may become a crutch for the domestic industry. No doubt the shortage has
catalyzed research & development prioritization for every firm. However, if China subsidizes the
research of TSMC and others, the state of the domestic industry depends on the American
government doing the same.
Regardless of the future result of government research subsidies, ensuring that the
industry’s supply chain is well-equipped and efficient is necessary. By collecting lead time,
supplier, and inventory data from major firms, the Biden Administration has committed to
ensuring the ongoing viability of the supply chain.61 Identifying the various bottlenecks in the
global supply chain will help the industry to cope with and predict future challenges. The
shortage has significantly affected several sectors, to the point where automobile and
semiconductor executives lobbied alongside one another for the subsidies and oversight to pass.
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Given its scope, legislation to fix supply chain issues will lend the industry ongoing
security and prevent future issues from destabilizing the economy. However, government
involvement is not enough to stimy supply chain instability. Firms must also commit to
supporting their suppliers and distributors enough to prevent potential gaps. While some may not
view this as the responsibility of individual firms, the onus to create a more reliable industry is
on them. Regular analysis and oversight of their own logistical bandwidth will enable firms to
develop and produce chipsets without interruption of supplies, thereby bolstering the viability of
the industry. Simply put, industry standards must change for the current development and
production cadences to remain attainable.
In the first week of October, America’s second largest foundry, GlobalFoundries,
announced that they had sold out of production capacity through 2023.62 Many experts expect
that the industry will be chasing supply, not demand, for the determinable future.63 Increasing
production capacity is a natural response to the shortage. It benefits manufacturers by allowing
them to maximize profits whilst giving fabless design firms the bandwidth to do the same. Given
the trajectory of the industry, capacity increases are necessary. However, were demand to
suddenly shift lower in the next 5-10 years, a glut could spell disaster for many small firms.
Firms must recognize the possibility of this occurring and prioritize their investment activities
very carefully. Because a supply surplus would force firms to sell units at survival cost, they
must maintain a financial cushion that will keep them afloat during such a period. Similarly,
firms’ attention must always be geared towards future progression. Capacity increases and
financial bulwarks will do them little good if their chips are generations behind. Therefore, the
potential impact of increased production capacity is only realized when a firm’s finances are
well-balanced and appropriately allocated.
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Achieving iterative improvements has set the pace of the semiconductor industry since its
founding. Regardless of firm structure and capability, research and development will always be
the most essential component of building a viable semiconductor firm. Rather than dedicating an
exponentially greater amount of resources into technical advancement- something already
required by Moore’s Law- it is more apropos to ensure that a firm’s R&D investments remain
efficient and appropriately speculative. Given its confidential nature, research scenarios are
difficult to generalize and analyze. However, as the funds required to iterate increase, a misstep
becomes continuously more costly. Analytical frameworks and appropriate product platform
development will help firms avoid major pitfalls in their research phase, ensuring their future
security. Simultaneously, the industry would be nowhere if firms did not take risks. Speculative
breakthroughs in architecture, component usage, and instruction sets can give firms a material
competitive advantage. Depending on the technical capability of any individual firm, the
appropriate mix of risk and certainty in the development phase will differ greatly. Regardless,
striking that balance adequately is perhaps the most important thing a firm can do to guarantee its
future. The semiconductor industry is at a crossroads, and the actions and decisions of a few
major firms will dictate the future of not only the industry, but the world and macroeconomy.

Conclusion
Although the semiconductor industry has experienced innumerable downturns due to supply
gluts or recessions, it has been forever changed by this most recent shortage. While capacity and
component supply restraints have always existed, the ongoing shortage shows no signs of abating
until at least 2023. Moreover, fiscal & monetary policy, capacity increases, and both internal and
non-firm innovation will do nothing to shorten it. By the time any of those changes are enacted,
the shortage will have been over with. Instead, the shortage should signal to the industry a need
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for permanent change. Whilst extending Moore’s Law and expanding capacity, there must also
be investments to build a more hardy, sustainable, and efficient supply chain. Product platforms,
previously developed to handle the production of multiple products, can be more flexibly
designed to take advantage of a range of components. While the largest firms already have ample
financial cushions, these changes will protect them and the marketplace against future issues.
Due to the vertical integration within this industry, efficiency maximization whilst still
maintaining a beneficial intra-firm structure is difficult, though mandatory. Moreover, the
diverging capabilities of firms within the industry create obstacles for material and ubiquitous
change. Catalysts for issues may vary from being logistical, financial, or technical in nature,
making them difficult for any one firm to adequately address. However, the future of the
economy largely relies on the reliable and steady progression of the semiconductor industry. The
application of its products into cars, appliances, and other consumer goods has led to rapid
growth for many sectors. And now, as with Moore’s Law, breaking that chain would result in a
multi-generational economic trough characterized by halting innovation. In many ways, the
creation of the semiconductor industry led humankind to many different, hugely implicative
discoveries. Now, as the industry reaches a hitherto incomprehensible scale, its beneficial impact
must be extended and its negative consequences reigned in.
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